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1. Introduction 
 
The discussion on trademark law and freedom of expression often focuses on cases where the 
courts invoked the fundamental guarantee of free speech as an external, higher ranking norm 
to prevent trademark protection from encroaching upon political, artistic or commercial 
freedom of expression.1 The present contribution to the debate, by contrast, focuses on 
different ways of ensuring sufficient room for free speech within the trademark system:  
 
- on the one hand, trademark law recognizes the need to keep certain signs free from 
protection. Signs may fall outside the trademark system by virtue of an outright 
exclusion from protection. They may also remain free because of a lack of distinctive 
character; 
  
- on the other hand, trademark law can restrict the scope of exclusive rights. The rights 
of trademark owners may be limited through strict requirements of use in the course of 
trade and use as a trademark. They may also remain limited because of the application 
of strict tests when determining a likelihood of confusion or dilution. Moreover, 
certain forms of use can be exempted from the control of the trademark owner by 
adopting exceptions.  
 
These different strategies can be seen as complementary tools: the recognition of a need to 
keep signs free prevents traders from acquiring trademark rights in the first place. Restrictions 
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on the scope of protection ensure the availability of signs once trademark protection is 
acquired. The application of these complementary tools leads to a public domain consisting of 
unprotected signs that are unencumbered by trademark rights and protected signs that remain 
free to common use in several respects. The public domain supported by trademark law thus 
offers a reservoir of unprotected and protected signs that are available for political, artistic and 
commercial speech.2 
 
In the following analysis, EU legislation and court decisions will be discussed that recognize a 
need to keep signs free from trademark protection (section 2) and restrict the scope of 
exclusive rights (section 3). The analysis gives rise to the question whether EU trademark law 
offers a satisfactory framework for reconciling trademark protection with freedom of 
expression (section 4). Drawing conclusions, potential amendments to EU trademark law will 
be considered, including recent proposals made by the European Commission (section 5).3  
   
2. Recognition of a Need to Keep Signs Free 
 
The recognition of a need to keep certain signs free from trademark protection leads to a 
public domain of signs that are unencumbered by trademark rights. By definition, trademark 
law does not interfere with the use of these unprotected signs for expressive purposes. The 
resulting freedom of use plays an important role in the trademark system. A reservoir of signs 
free to common use offers traders equal access to communication tools that can be used to 
inform consumers about product characteristics and compete for market shares. Freedom to 
use descriptive signs and generic indications, for instance, ensures that merchants can easily 
convey information about their goods and services.4 Besides this interest in commercial 
freedom of expression and fair competition, signs in the public domain also satisfy speech 
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J. Litman, “The Public Domain”, Emory Law Journal 39 (1990), p. 965. As to the debate on the freedom of 
speech underpinning, see D.L. Zimmerman, “Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the 
Public Domain”, Fordham Law Review 73 (2004), p. 297; Y. Benkler, “Through the Looking Glass: Alice and 
the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain”, Law and Contemporary Problems 66 (2003), p. 173; Y. 
Benkler, “Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain”, 
New York University Law Review 74 (1999), p. 354 (361-162); R.P. Merges, “A New Dynamism in the Public 
Domain”, University of Chicago Law Review 71 (2004), p. 183 (184).   
3
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(COD), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/tm/. For the preparatory in-depth analysis of EU 
trademark law underlying the Proposal, see Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 
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4
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comment on the need to keep free in trademark law, see J. Phillips, “Trade Mark Law and the Need to Keep Free 
– Intellectual Property Monopolies Have Their Limits”, International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law 36 (2005), p. 389. 
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interests of the general public. If signs of particular significance, such as cultural and religious 
symbols, are freely available for all, their meanings and connotations can be discussed and 
developed in an open communication process that is not dominated by an individual rights 
owner.5  
 
In spite of these advantages arising from the absence of trademark protection, it would be an 
oversimplification to posit that denial of trademark protection generally supports freedom of 
expression. An economic analysis of the interplay between intellectual property protection 
and the public domain suggests that the grant of trademark protection may also have 
beneficial effects. It may lead to an enrichment of the meanings and connotations attached to 
a given sign. The more complex a sign’s denotations, the higher might be its value for the 
communication process. Salzberger illustrates this potential positive effect as follows:  
 
“Let us assume that the government changes the designation of particular common 
land into private property, this piece of land is subsequently purchased by an 
individual on which she builds an architectural masterpiece. This new building is 
privately owned in the sense that no one can enter the building, use it, sell it, or 
eliminate it save its private owner or under her permission. But the pleasure of 
viewing the building for the rest of the community, the inspiration it creates, its 
contribution to future architectural plans can be regarded as an enlargement of the 
public domain.”6  
 
In this vein, it might be argued that trademark protection may enlarge the public domain by 
adding complex meanings to a formerly undeveloped sign in the public domain.7 The 
question, then, is whether the potential benefits accruing from the grant of trademark 
protection are capable of outweighing the detriment flowing from the loss of freedom to use 
the sign in its undeveloped state.  
 
With regard to the examples given above, this is doubtful. An undeveloped descriptive sign in 
the public domain is a central communication tool for traders seeking to inform consumers 
about product characteristics. The acquisition of trademark rights seems unlikely to outweigh 
the loss of the ability to use the sign for the purpose of informing consumers. A sign of 
cultural significance already has various meanings and connotations attached to it. If the 
cultural meanings evoked by the sign are blurred or even suppressed as a result of the 
acquisition of trademark protection, the sign’s expressive value will be reduced rather than 
being enhanced.  
 
                                                 
5
 For a more detailed analysis of the need to keep signs of cultural and religious significance free, see K. Assaf, 
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6
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7
 Cf. M. Richardson, “Trade Marks and Language”, Sydney Law Review 26 (2004), p. 193 (213-215), who 
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2.1 Instruments Available in EU Trademark Law 
 
EU trademark law contains several absolute grounds for refusal that exclude signs from 
trademark registration because they must remain available for the public or for other traders. 
The need to keep certain signs free has been recognized explicitly by the CJEU. In the 
decision Windsurfing Chiemsee, the Court explained that absolute grounds for refusal 
concerning descriptive signs served the public interest. They ensured that descriptive signs or 
indications relating to the categories of goods or services may be freely used by all.8 With 
regard to denominations of geographical origin, the Court added that it was in the public 
interest that they remained available 
 
“not least because they may be an indication of the quality and other characteristics 
of the categories of goods concerned, and may also, in various ways, influence 
consumer tastes by, for instance, associating the goods with a place that may give rise 
to a favourable response.”9 
 
In the area of official signs and emblems, EU Member States enjoy the freedom of excluding 
from registration signs of high symbolic value, in particular religious symbols.10 This further 
ground for refusal may be understood to cover not only signs with a religious meaning, such 
as holy names, pictures and icons, but also signs which, in the light of a country’s history and 
cultural traditions, are perceived as national symbols even though they do not constitute 
official state emblems. This may include historical and cultural monuments. EU Member 
States that adopted this optional ground for refusal include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia.11 In other EU Member States, official 
emblems and signs of high symbolic value may be excluded from registration on the grounds 
that they are deceptive12 or contrary to public policy or accepted principles of morality.13  
 
With regard to signs having cultural significance but no high symbolic value, however, EU 
trademark law does not provide for specific grounds for refusal. Discussing the requirements 
for registering the first nine notes of the piano piece “Für Elise” in Shield Mark/Kist, 
Advocate General Colomer expressed the view that it was difficult to accept   
 
“that a creation of the mind, which forms part of the universal cultural heritage, 
should be appropriated indefinitely by a person to be used on the market in order to 
                                                 
8
 See CJEU, judgment of May 4, 1999, cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee, para. 25. 
9
 See CJEU, ibid., para. 26. 
10
 See Article 3(2)(b) TMD 
11
 See Article 11(1), sub 11, of the Trademark Act of Bulgaria, Sec. 2(1)(i) Act on Trademarks of the Czech 
Republic, Article 3(2)(a) of the Trademark Act of Greece, Article 3(2)(c) of the Trademark Law of Hungary, 
Article 10 of the Trademark Law of Italy, Article 6(1), sub 9, of the Trademark Law of Latvia, Article 131(2)(v) 
of the Trademark Law of Poland, Article 238(4)(b) of the Industrial Property Code of Portugal, Sec. 5(1)(j) of 
the Trademarks Act of Slovakia. These laws are available online at www.wipo.int/clea. 
12
 See Article 3(1)(g) TMD and Article 7(1)(g) CTMR. The public may be misled to believe that the applicant 
has a connection with the public institution concerned.  
13
 See Article 3(1)(f) TMD and Article 7(1)(f) CTMR. This latter option may be applied to religious symbols. 
For instance, see German Federal Patent Court, 2 November 1993, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 
1994, p. 377. In this decision, the German Federal Patent Court denied registration of the word mark “Messias” 
as a trademark for clothing, shoes and hats because of a conflict with morality and public order. Cf. also J. 
Phillips/I. Simon, “No Marks for Hitler: a Radical Reappraisal of Trade Mark Use and Political Sensitivity”, 
European Intellectual Property Review 2004, p. 327, who propose preventing the use of offensive marks by 
registering them as “no-marks”, the use of which is prohibited. 
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distinguish the goods he produces or the services he provides with an exclusivity 
which not even its author’s estate enjoys.”14  
 
The CJEU, however, did not invoke this argument to exclude the first nine notes of “Für 
Elise” from trademark registration. Instead, the Court clarified that, in the case of a melody, 
the requirement of graphical representation could be satisfied by providing standard musical 
notation.15 Cultural significance as such, therefore, does not constitute an obstacle to 
registration. The particular recognition and popularity which a sign in the public domain 
enjoys does not hinder its appropriation as a trademark.16  
 
National court decisions confirm that cultural significance does not necessarily preempt  
registrability. The German Federal Patent Court, for instance, rejected an argument that 
registration of the Mona Lisa was contrary to public policy or accepted principles of morality, 
holding that appropriation of the Mona Lisa on the basis of trademark law would not violate 
the principle that cultural expressions should remain freely available for the public after the 
expiry of copyright protection.17 However, the Court held that the applicant failed to establish 
the requisite distinctiveness. Because the painting was frequently used by third parties in 
advertising, the public would regard the Mona Lisa as a mere advertising instrument rather 
than as an indication of source.18 The Court also held that, because of the frequent use in 
advertising, the painting had become customary in established trade practices.19 
 
In cases of “cultural heritage grabbing”, the registration of a sign of cultural significance may 
still be denied or invalidated because the application was made in bad faith. Such a case may 
arise where the applicant registers a sign of cultural significance without intending to make 
genuine use of the sign in trade. Instead, the applicant aims at exploiting the popularity of the 
cultural sign by using the registration as a vehicle to impose an obligation on other traders to 
obtain licenses for its use. The CJEU developed several factors that are relevant to the 
identification of bad faith applications. In particular, it may be relevant that the applicant 
knows or must know that a third party is using a sign identical or similar to the sign for which 
registration is sought, and that the applicant intends to prevent that third party from continuing 
to use the sign.20 
 
                                                 
14
 See Opinion of Advocate General Colomer of April 3, 2003, in case C-283/01, Shield Mark/Kist, para. 52. 
15
 See CJEU, judgment of November 27, 2003, case C-283/01, Shield Mark/Kist. 
16
 For instance, see Dutch Supreme Court, judgment of March 5, 1999, case no. 16812, C97/291, published in 
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2000, no. 306, para. 3.6. Instead of a cultural heritage sign, this decision concerned 
the sign “Route 66”. 
17
 See German Federal Patent Court, 25 November 1997, case 24 W (pat) 188/96, Mona Lisa, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1998, p. 1021 (1023).  
18
 German Federal Patent Court, ibid., p. 1022. 
19
 German Federal Patent Court, ibid., p. 1023. For case comments, see Senftleben, supra note 5, p. 102-104; 
Assaf, supra note 5, p. 5; A. Ohly, “Von einem Indianerhäuptling, einer Himmelsscheibe, einer Jeans und dem 
Lächeln der Mona Lisa – Überlegungen zum Verhältnis zwischen Urheber- und Kennzeichenrecht”, in: L. 
Pahlow/J. Eisfeld (eds.), Grundlagen und Grundfragen des Geistigen Eigentums, Festgabe für Diethelm Klippel 
zum 65. Geburtstag, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2008, p. 203; F. Klinkert/F. Schwab, “Markenrechtlicher Raubbau 
an gemeinfreien Werken – ein richtungsweisendes „Machtwort“ durch den Mona Lisa-Beschluss des 
Bundespatentgerichts?”, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1999, p. 1067; W. Nordemann, “Mona 
Lisa als Marke”, Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 1997, p. 389.  
20
 See CJEU, judgment of June 11, 2009, case C-529/07, Lindt/Hauswirth, para. 53. For a more detailed analysis 
of bad faith trademark registrations, see A. Tsoutsanis, Het merkdepot te kwader trouw, Deventer: Kluwer 2005; 
H. Helm, “Die bösgläubige Markenanmeldung”, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1996, p. 593. 
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2.2 Distinctive Character as a Gatekeeper 
 
Assessing the potential of absolute grounds for refusal for keeping signs free, a fundamental 
difference between the aforementioned EU provisions must be taken into account: whereas 
the absolute ground for refusal relating to a conflict with public policy or principles of 
morality, and the absolute ground relating to signs of high symbolic value cannot be 
overcome by showing that a shape has acquired distinctiveness as a result of use in trade, the 
absolute grounds for refusal relating to non-distinctive, descriptive and generic signs no 
longer apply when a sign has become distinctive because of the use made of it in trade.21  
 
To establish distinctive character, it is sufficient to show that the relevant public, “or at least a 
significant proportion thereof” perceives the descriptive sign as an indication of commercial 
origin.22 If distinctive character can be demonstrated, the scope of protection still depends on 
the degree to which distinctiveness is attained. For instance, a trademark based on a 
descriptive indication may remain a weak trademark. Minor deviations from the mark or an 
emphasis on its descriptive character may already eliminate a likelihood of confusion. 
Therefore, the impact on the availability of the sign may remain limited.23 The 
communication process surrounding the sign, however, may still be influenced heavily by the 
trademark owner. An aggressive enforcement strategy may have a deterrent effect on 
political, artistic and commercial speech. 
 
Furthermore, a sign consisting of combined non-distinctive, descriptive or generic indications 
may be found to be inherently distinctive. In the decision Biomild, the CJEU stated that a 
combination of descriptive elements may not be descriptive itself, if it created an impression 
which was “sufficiently far removed from that produced by the simple combination of those 
elements.”24 The trader using an unusual combination of descriptive indications as a 
trademark may thus acquire protection in the EU without having to show that the sign has 
acquired distinctive character in consequence of use in trade. Similarly, indications of quality 
or incitements to purchase that are used in advertising slogans may be found to be inherently 
distinctive. In particular, this may be the case  
 
“where those marks are not merely an ordinary advertising message, but possess a 
certain originality or resonance, requiring at least some interpretation by the relevant 
public, or setting off a cognitive process in the minds of that public.”25 
 
The problems arising from this reliance on distinctive character as a gatekeeper for the 
acquisition of trademark rights can be illustrated by examining the situation in the field of 
signs of cultural significance. The name and portrait of a famous artist enjoys EU trademark 
                                                 
21
 Article 3(3) TMD. 
22
 CJEU, 7 September 2006, case C-108/05, Europolis, para. 28. As to the factors considered in this context, see 
CJEU, 4 May 1999, cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee, para. 51. 
23
 For instance, see Austrian Supreme Court, 23 March 2010, case 17 Ob 18/09k, Gute Laune Tee, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International 2011, p. 82; German Federal Court of Justice, 19 November 2009, 
case I ZR 142/07, “MIXI”, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2010, p. 729. 
24
 CJEU, 12 February 2004, case C-265/00, Biomild, para. 40. However, this requirement was not satisfied, for 
instance, in the case of the sign “COLOR EDITION”. See CJEU, 25 February 2010, case C-408/08 P, 
Lancôme/OHIM. 
25
 See CJEU, 1 January 2010, case C-398/08 P, Audi/OHIM, para. 57, concerning the advertising slogan 
“Vorsprung durch Technik” (advance through technology). 
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protection in many cases.26 An attempt to create a solid basis for the exclusion of such 
portraits from trademark protection has been made by the German Federal Patent Court in a 
case concerning the registration of a portrait photograph of the actress Marlene Dietrich. The 
Court did not content itself with the exclusion of trademark protection on the grounds that the 
photograph was devoid of distinctive character. This solution would have meant that the 
exclusion could be surmounted once distinctiveness is acquired through use in trade.  
 
Instead, the Court argued that the photograph constituted a mere reproduction of the goods for 
which registration was sought, and invoked the exclusion of “the shape which results from the 
nature of the goods themselves”.27 The application of this shape exclusion would have been a 
remarkable step in keeping portraits of famous persons free from trademark protection 
altogether. In contrast to an exclusion based on a lack of distinctiveness, the shape exclusions 
in EU trademark law cannot be overcome through use in trade.28 The effect of the application 
of the shape exclusion would thus have been comparable to an exclusion on the basis of a 
conflict with public policy or an exclusion because of high symbolic value. 
 
In contrast to the Federal Patent Court, however, the German Federal Court of Justice saw no 
need to apply shape exclusions in this context.29 Overruling the Patent Court’s decision, the 
Federal Court of Justice invoked the requirement of distinctiveness to refuse trademark 
protection in respect of goods and services concerning the work and life of the actress. The 
Court denied distinctiveness with regard to books, magazines, photographs, posters, CDs, 
DVDs, musical performances and film productions on the ground that the photograph lacked 
the capability of indicating a commercial source. In respect of these goods and services, it 
would be perceived as a mere description of product contents.30 However, the decision left the 
door open to the possibility of the Marlene Dietrich photograph becoming distinctive through 
use in trade.31 
 
The Federal Court of Justice added that the portrait photograph was inherently distinctive with 
regard to merchandising articles, such as scarves, hats, shirts and shoes. In this respect, it 
rejected the view expressed by the Federal Patent Court that consumers would perceive the 
portrait as a mere marketing tool and fail to understand that it served as an indication of 
commercial source.32 The Federal Court of Justice emphasized instead that the photograph did 
not necessarily need to be placed prominently on the articles. It could also be used as a label 
                                                 
26
 For instance, see CTM 001081314, “Beethoven’; CTM 000945774, “Descartes’; CTM 001593128, “Albert 
Einstein’; CTM 003805942, “Goethe’; IR 0858800, “Henrik Ibsen’; CTM 001358621, “Vincent van Gogh’; 
CTM 005468996, “Mona Lisa’; CTM 000021071 “Mozart’; CTM 001334036, “Picasso’; CTM 000119354, 
“Rembrandt’; CTM 004278214, “Shakespeare’; CTM 003877354, “Giuseppe Verdi’; CTM 000047365, 
“Vermeer’; CTM 000996199, “Leonardo da Vinci’; CTM 003437811, “Andy Warhol”. For a description of the 
practice of granting portrait trademarks, see C. Gielen, “Portretmerk: een non-merk?”, in: D.J.G. Visser (ed.), 
Commercieel Portretrecht, Amstelveen: deLex 2009, p. 113. 
27
 Article 3(1)(e) TMD. See German Federal Patent Court, 9 November 2005, case 29 W (pat) 147/03, 
“Porträtfoto Marlene Dietrich”, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2006, p. 333 (para. 4.2). 
28
 See CJEU, 18 June 2002, case C-299/99, Philips/Remington, para. 57; judgment of September 20, 2007, case 
C-371/06, Benetton/G-Star, para. 25-27; judgment of September 14, 2010, case C-48/09 P, Lego/Mega Brands, 
para. 47. 
29
 See German Federal Court of Justice, 24 April 2008, case I ZB 21/06, “Marlene-Dietrich-Bildnis”, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2008, p. 1093 (para. 11). 
30
 See German Federal Court of Justice, ibid., para. 12-15. 
31
 See German Federal Court of Justice, ibid., para. 17. 
32
 See German Federal Patent Court, ibid., para. 8.1 and 8.2. 
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attached to the goods. Given this option of use as a badge of origin, distinctive character could 
not be denied.33  
 
3. Restriction of the Scope of Exclusive Rights 
 
Besides the interest in a reservoir of signs free for common use, the public interst in the 
availability of signs also concerns trademarks enjoying protection. This public interest is 
closely related to political and artistic freedom of expression. As observed by Professor 
Cooper Dreyfuss, trademarks 
 
“have become products in their own right, valued as indicators of the status, 
preferences, and aspirations of those who use them. Some trademarks have worked 
their way into the English language; others provide bases for vibrant, evocative 
metaphors. In a sense, trademarks are the emerging lingua france: with a sufficient 
command of these terms, one can make oneself understood the world over, and in the 
process, enjoy the comforts of home.”34  
 
As trademarks have become focal points of communication – densely packed information 
units “infused with sets of denotations and associated connotations” –, loss of the ability to 
use trademarks may impede the ability to communicate.35 Against this background, Cooper 
Dreyfuss described the need to keep expressive use of the associations and meanings triggered 
by a trademark free.36 Commentators should be free to use trademarks as a basis for 
criticizing an enterprise’s policies. Artists should be able to include trademarks in their 
creative productions. Consumers should be free to refer to trademarks as symbols of a 
particular lifestyle or attitude.37  
 
It has also been pointed out that the richness of associations and meanings attached to a 
trademark is the result of a joint effort of trademark owners and consumers alike. It is the 
consuming public that frequently imbues trademarks with connotations distinct from and 
sometimes unrelated to the advertising messages conveyed by the trademark owner.38 The 
entitlement of the general public to the use of protected trademarks in social and cultural 
                                                 
33
 See German Federal Court of Justice, ibid., para. 19-22. See also German Federal Court of Justice, 31 March 
2010, case I ZB 62/09, “Marlene-Dietrich-Bildnis II”, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2010, p. 
825 (para. 20-28). 
34
 R. Cooper Dreyfuss, “Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation”, Notre Dame 
Law Review 65 (1990), p. 397 (397-398). 
35
 Cooper Dreyfuss, ibid., 415. See also K. Aoki, “How the World Dreams Itself to be American: Reflections on 
the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms”, Loyola of 
Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997), p. 523 (542-543). 
36
 Cooper Dreyfuss, ibid., 415-418.  
37
 Cf. P. Gulasekaram, “Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized 
Trademark Use in Expressive Works”, Washington Law Review 80 (2005), p. 887. 
38
 Cf. D.R. Gerhardt, “Consumer Investment in Trademarks”, North Carolina Law Review 88 (2010), p. 101; 
L.A. Heymann, “The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer”, 
Georgia Law Review 43 (2009), p. 651; J. Litman, “Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the 
Advertising Age”, Yale Law Journal 108 (1999), p. 1 (15-16); S. Wilf, “Who Authors Trademarks?”, Cardozo 
Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1999), p. 1; A. Kozinski, “Trademarks Unplugged”, New York 
University Law Review 68 (1993), p. 960 (975); L.P Ramsey, “Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark 
Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders”, Buffalo Law Review 58 (2010), p. 851. However, see the 
critical comments on the limitation of trademark rights made by M. Richardson, “Trade Marks and Language”, 
Sydney Law Review 26 (2004), p. 193. 
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discourse, therefore, can also be seen as a corollary of the public’s contribution to the creation 
of trade symbols with complex meanings and connotations. In this line of reasoning, 
trademark law has to exempt socially and culturally valuable forms of trademark use from the 
control of the trademark owner.  
 
3.1 Inherent Limits of Protection in EU Trademark Law 
 
EU trademark law offers certain freedoms of third party use notwithstanding that trademark 
rights may exist in a sign. To some extent, this breathing space follows from inherent limits of 
exclusive trademark rights: the requirement of use in trade and use as a trademark, and more 
specific criteria governing the different infringement actions. 
 
For trademark rights to be invoked successfully under harmonized EU trademark law, it must 
be shown, first of all, that use of a conflicting sign has taken place “in the course of trade” and 
“in relation to goods or services”.39 These general protection requirements could serve as 
filters ensuring that socially and culturally valuable forms of use remain unaffected by 
trademark rights. Under the aegis of the CJEU, however, these general protection 
requirements have been relaxed continuously. They do not necessarily constitute substantial 
hurdles for trademark owners seeking protection.  
 
Use of a trademark constitutes “use in the course of trade” in the EU where it occurs “in the 
context of commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private 
matter.”40 This test constitutes a rather low threshold. Nevertheless, it confines trademark 
rights to use that takes place in a commercial context. The use of a trademark for the purposes 
of private study, political debate, religious ceremonies, teaching or academic research is 
unlikely to constitute “use in the course of trade” as long as it is of a purely non-commercial 
nature. Irrespective of the acquisition of trademark rights, a religious sign, therefore, remains 
available for strictly religious purposes. A sign of cultural significance remains available for 
strictly cultural purposes. However, use of a trademark in a religious, political or cultural 
context may be qualified as use in trade, if it is combined with a commercial activity, such as 
marketing of T-shirts or postcards. 
 
To qualify as relevant trademark use, an allegedly infringing use must constitute use “in 
relation to goods or services”. However, this requirement is applied flexibly by the CJEU as 
well. Instead of serving as a filter to exclude, from the outset, all instances where the 
trademark is not used in the traditional manner, i.e., to indicate commercial source,41 a mere 
reference to a trademark may be sufficient to trigger an infringement action. For instance, use 
of a mark by a third party to inform the public about repair and maintenance services for 
trademarked products has been found to constitute trademark use.42 The CJEU also held that 
use in comparative advertising constituted trademark use, because the advertiser used her 
competitor’s trademark to distinguish her own products from those of the competitor.43 In 
addition, the Court assumed that there was relevant trademark use where a third party used a 
                                                 
39
 Article 5(1) and (2) TMD and Article 9(1) CTMR. 
40
 See CJEU, judgment of March 23, 2010, cases C-236/08-238/08, Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 50; CJEU, 
judgment of November 12, 2002, case C-206/01, Arsenal/Reed, para. 40. 
41
 This stricter test, however, was mentioned with regard to the traditional identification function of trademarks 
in CJEU, judgment of January 25, 2007, case C-48/05, Opel/Autec, para. 24.  
42
 See CJEU, judgment of February 23, 1999, case C-63/97, BMW/Deenik, para. 42. 
43
 See CJEU, 12 June 2008, case C-533/06, O2/Hutchison, para. 35-36; CJEU, 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08-
238/08, Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 71. 
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company, trade or shop name in such a way that a link was established with the goods or 
services offered by that third party.44 Hence, the Court brought several forms of referential 
use within the ambit of exclusive trademark rights.  
 
In the light of this elastic standard, use of a trademark as an embellishment was held to 
constitute actionable trademark use as well. In the German case Lila Postkarte, the defendant 
sold postcards that alluded ironically to trademarks and advertising campaigns of the 
chocolate producer Milka. On purple background corresponding to Milka’s abstract colour 
mark, the postcard sought to ridicule the nature idyll with cows and mountains that is evoked 
in Milka advertising. It showed the following poem attributed to “Rainer Maria Milka”:  
 
“Über allen Wipfeln ist Ruh, 
irgendwo blökt eine Kuh. 
Muh!”45 
 
Assessing this ironic play with Milka insignia, the German Federal Court of Justice confirmed 
the weakness of the requirement of use “in relation to goods or services”. It held that for the 
use of Milka trademarks to constitute trademark use in this sense, it was sufficient that the 
postcard called to mind the well-known Milka signs.46 The inherent limitation of trademark 
rights to use “as a trademark” thus proved to be an insufficient safeguard of the freedom to 
make a trademark parody. Instead, the Court had to invoke the open-ended defence of use 
with “due cause” which the German Trademark Act provides in line with Article 5(2) TMD. 
Weighing Milka’s concerns about a disparagement of the trademarks against the fundamental 
guarantee of the freedom of art, the Court concluded that the freedom of art had to prevail in 
light of the ironic statement made with the postcard.47  
 
Besides the general criteria of “use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or 
services”, EU trademark law sets forth specific infringement criteria relating to protection 
against confusion and protection against dilution. These specific infringement criteria also 
shape the relationship between trademark law and freedom of speech: the stricter they are 
applied, the more freedom of use remains for other traders and the public at large. In the area 
of protection against confusion, for instance, a limited scope of protection may result from a 
low degree of distinctiveness.48 In the case Picasso/Picaro, the CJEU had to decide on an 
opposition lodged against the registration of the word sign “PICARO” on the basis of the 
earlier Community Trade Mark “PICASSO”. The case concerned use for vehicles. The Court 
                                                 
44
 See CJEU, judgment of 11 September 2007, case C-17/06, Céline, para. 23. See also CJEU, 19 February 2009, 
case C-62/08, UDV/Brandtraders, para. 47. The emphasis on the criterion of a mere link with the goods or 
services offered under a conflicting sign was particularly confirmed in cases dealing with keyword advertising. 
See CJEU, 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08-238/08, Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 72; 12 July 2011, case C-
324/09, L’Oréal/eBay, para. 92. 
45
 ‘It is calm above the tree tops, somewhere a cow is bellowing. Moo!’ See German Federal Court of Justice, 3 
February 2005, case I ZR 159/02, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2005, p. 583, ‘Lila Postkarte’. 
Cf. C. Born, Zur Zulässigkeit einer humorvollen Markenparodie – Anmerkungen zum Urteil des BGH ‘Lila 
Postkarte’, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2006, p. 192. 
46
 See the reference to CJEU, judgment of October 23, 2003, case C-408/01, Adidas/Fitnessworld, para. 39, in 
the decision “Lila Postkarte” of the German Federal Court of Justice, judgment of February 3, 2005, case I ZR 
159/02, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2005, p. 583 (584). 
47
 See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 584-585.  
48
 The degree of distinctiveness is one of the factors to be considered in the framework of the infringement 
analysis. See CJEU, judgment of September 29, 1998, case C-39/97, Canon/Cannon; judgment of June 22, 1999, 
case C-342/97, Lloyd/Loint’s. 
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assumed in this context that, “confronted with the word sign PICASSO, the relevant public 
inevitably sees in it a reference to the painter.”49 Against this background, the Court 
concluded that 
 
“given the painter’s renown with that public, that particularly rich conceptual 
reference is such as greatly to reduce the resonance with which, in this case, the sign 
is endowed as a mark, among others, of motor vehicles.”50  
 
Therefore, the scope of protection against confusion may remain limited in the case of signs 
of cultural significance. It may also be difficult to establish that a sign of cultural significance 
has become a mark with a reputation eligible for anti-dilution protection.51 
 
The situation seems different, however, where a trademark consists of a sign that has cultural 
significance but is not widely known among the consuming public. A name, symbol or 
melody taken from a culturally important but relatively unknown work is unlikely to have a 
cultural connotation capable of weakening the recognition of the sign as an indication of 
commercial origin. Who thinks of Nike, the Greek goddess of victory, when seeing the 
“NIKE” trademark?52 Who is aware of culturally important signs of indigenous communities?  
 
Given the relatively low threshold for acquiring anti-dilution protection in the EU, unknown 
signs with cultural significance may even become eligible for enhanced protection against 
dilution. In contrast to other trademark systems requiring recognition among the general 
consuming public, niche reputation is sufficient under EU trademark law.53 For a trademark to 
constitute a mark with a reputation, it must be known by the target group of the goods or 
services marketed under the trademark. In the case of specific products, this target group may 
be a specialized public, such as traders in a specific sector. The required degree of knowledge 
is reached when the mark is known by a significant part of the relevant public.54  
 
Once reputation is established, EU trademark law offers anti-dilution protection covering 
blurring, tarnishment and unfair free-riding in competitive and non-competitive situations.55 
The evidence to be produced need not necessarily include proof of a change in the economic 
behaviour of consumers. In respect of the taking of unfair advantage, it suffices to show that  
                                                 
49
 See CJEU, judgment of January 12, 2006, case C-361/04 P, Picasso/Picaro, para. 27. 
50
 CJEU, ibid., para. 27.  
51
 Cf. EU Court of First Instance, 30 June 2009, case T-435/05, Danjaq/OHIM, para. 26-31, rejecting the 
argument that the sign “Dr. No” had become a well-known mark in the sense of Article 6bis PC. Cf. A. Ohly, 
“Areas of Overlap Between Trade Mark Rights, Copyright and Design Rights in German Law – Report Prepared 
on Behalf of the German Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property”, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil 2007, p. 704 (709). 
52
 With regard to these and further examples, see Assaf, supra note 5, p. 2-3. 
53
 Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben, “The Trademark Tower of Babel – Dilution Concepts in International, US and EC 
Law”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 40 (2009), p. 45; I. Simon Fhima, 
“The Actual Dilution Requirement in the United States, United Kingdom and European Union: A Comparative 
Analysis”, Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 12 (2006), p. 271; B. Beebe, “A Defense 
of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law”, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal 16 (2006), p. 1143 (1146-1147 and 1174); J.T. McCarthy, “Dilution of a Trademark: European and 
United States Law Compared”, Trademark Reporter 94 (2004), p. 1163.  
54
 See CJEU, judgment of 14 September 1999, case C-375/97, General Motors/Yplon, para. 24 and 26. In respect 
of the territorial expansion required, see CJEU, ibid., para. 28; and judgment of October 6, 2009, case C-301/07, 
Pago/Lattella, para. 29. 
55
 See CJEU, judgment of January 9, 2003, case C-292/00, Davidoff/Gofkid; CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2009, 
case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure. 
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“a third party attempts, through the use of a sign similar to a mark with a reputation, 
to ride on the coat-tails of that mark.”56  
 
Moreover, the CJEU refused to consider the need to keep protected signs available when 
determining the scope of protection. In the decision Adidas/Marca, the Court explained that it 
was clear that the requirement of availability was  
 
“extraneous both to the assessment of the degree of similarity between the mark with a 
reputation and the sign used by the third party and to the link which may be made by 
the relevant public between that mark and the sign.”57 
 
3.2 Exceptions to Exclusive Rights 
 
Besides the described inherent limits of protection, EU trademark law creates room for 
unauthorized trademark use through several exceptions to the exclusive rights of trademark 
owners. The proprietor of a trademark is not entitled under EU trademark law to prohibit a 
third party from using descriptive indications in the course of trade, provided that the use 
takes place in accordance with “honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.”58 If 
trademark protection is acquired with regard to a descriptive sign, this exception ensures that 
the public and other traders can still use the sign for the purpose of indicating the 
characteristics of goods or services. This type of commercial expression is thus safeguarded. 
For instance, a geographical name that has become a trademark remains available for use as 
an indication of the geographical origin of goods or services from the area concerned. As long 
as the user of a geographical term is not found to be unfairly competing with the proprietor of 
the trademark, the exception may even cover use of the indication as part of the labelling of 
products having the geographical origin.59  
 
Similarly, commercial use may be justified in the light of the exemption of descriptive use, if 
a sign of cultural or religious significance is perceived by the public as an indication of 
product characteristics rather than an indication of origin. The indications “Mozarttorte” 
(Mozart cake) and “Mozartkugel” (Mozart ball), for instance, are likely to be perceived as an 
indication of a particular type of cake or chocolate product by the consuming public in several 
EU Member States. Against this background, use of these indications – in the sense of 
                                                 
56
 CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2009, case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure, para. 49. However, see judgment of 
November 27, 2008, case C-252/07, Intel/CPM, para. 77, with regard to blurring and tarnishment where 
evidence of a change in consumer behavior may be required. Cf. A. Bouvel, “Marques et renommée: À propos 
de l’arrêt “Intel” rendu par la Cour de justice des communautés européennes le 27 novembre 2008 (aff. C-
252/07)”, in: C. Geiger/J. Schmidt-Szalewski (eds.), Les défis du droit des marques au XXIe siècle, Strasbourg: 
Litec 2010, p. 123; A.A. Quaedvlieg, “INTEL en verwatering: Economisch gedrag en juridisch bewijs”, Bijblad 
bij de industriële eigendom 2009, p. 253; A.A. Quaedvlieg, “Herkomst- en goodwillinbreuk in het merkenrecht 
na INTEL en l’Oréal”, Ars Aequi 2009, p. 799; S. Middlemiss/S. Warner, “The Protection of Marks with a 
Reputation: Intel v CPM”, European Intellectual Property Review 2009, p. 326 (331-332). For a critical 
comment on intuitive protection against free-riding as a species of unjust enrichment law, M.A. Lemley/M.P. 
McKenna, “Owning Mark(et)s”, Michigan Law Review 109 (2010), p. 137. 
57
 CJEU, judgment of April 10, 2008, case C-102/07, Adidas/Marca, para. 43. 
58
 See Article 6(1)(b) TMD and Article 12(b) CTMR. 
59
 See CJEU, judgment of January 7, 2004, case C-100/02, Gerolsteiner Brunnen/Putsch, para. 15 and 26. 
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information about product characteristics – is unlikely to give rise to a conflict with the 
Community Trade Mark “MOZART”.60  
 
If a sign becomes a mark with a reputation, it enjoys, as explained above, not only protection 
against confusion but also protection against blurring, tarnishment and unfair free-riding. Yet 
even in this area of enhanced protection against dilution, trademark rights cannot successfully 
be invoked, if the defendant’s use of the trademark is made with “due cause”.61 As the Lila 
Postkarte decision shows, this open-ended due cause defence can be employed to offer room 
for trademark parody. More generally, it may justify use for the purposes of criticism and 
review. By finding that unauthorized use was made with due cause, courts in the EU can thus 
ensure that trademarked signs remain available for public debate, even if they become marks 
with a reputation.62 In Interflora/Marks & Spencer, the CJEU also recognized a due cause 
defence with regard to unauthorized use of a trademark aiming to inform consumers about 
alternative offers in the marketplace.63 The “due cause” defence, therefore, also serves as a 
means of enhancing competition by keeping protected signs available for use by other traders.   
 
Further exceptions to trademark rights in the EU concern use of one’s own name or address in 
the course of trade,64 and use necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or 
service, in particular as accessories or spare parts.65 On the basis of EU legislation in the field 
of misleading and comparative advertising,66 the CJEU moreover established an additional 
exception covering the use of a trademark in permissible comparative advertising satisfying 
all conditions following from EU legislation in that area.67 References to another’s trademark 
in comparative advertising, or advertising indicating the intended purpose of goods or 
services, thus need not constitute trademark infringement even though it may constitute, as 
discussed above, relevant “use in relation to goods or services” under the elastic test of 
trademark use applied by the CJEU. 
 
                                                 
60
 See Higher Court of Appeals München, judgment of July 26, 2001, case 29 U 6000/00, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht-Rechtsprechungsreport 2002, p. 12 (13). In the meantime, the Community Trade 
Mark has been invalidated because of its descriptive character with regard to “pastry and confectionary, 
chocolate products and sugar confectionary”. See EU Court of First Instance, judgment of July 9, 2008, case T-
304/06, Paul Reber/OHIM, para. 99. As to the distinction between use as a trademark and use as a product 
description, see V. Di Cataldo, “The Trade Mark with a Reputation in EU Law – Some Remarks on the Negative 
Condition “Without Due Cause””, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 42 (2011), 
p. 833 (838-840). 
61
 See Article 5(2) TMD and Article 9(1)(c) CTMR. 
62
 As to the role of the due cause defence in safeguarding freedom of expression, see also German Federal Court 
of Justice, 11 March 2008, case VI ZR 7/07, “Gen-Milch”, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2008, p. 2110; 
District Court of Amsterdam, 22 December 2006, case KG ZA 06-2120, “Denk vooruit”, Intellectuele eigendom 
en reclamerecht 2007, p. 139; Paris Court of Appeals, 26 February 2003, Greenpeace/Esso, International Review 
of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 35 (2004), p. 342. For a broader overview of case law, see 
Sakulin, supra note 1; C. Geiger, “Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression – the Proportionality of Criticism”, 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 38 (2007), p. 317; C. Rohnke/K. Bott/K.-U. 
Jonas/S. Asschenfeldt, “Konflikte zwischen Markenrechten und dem Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung”, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil 2005, p. 419.  
63
 CJEU, 22 September 2011, case C-323/09, Interflora/Marks & Spencer, para. 91. 
64
 See Article 6(1)(a) TMD and Article 12(a) CTMR. 
65
 See Article 6(1)(c) TMD and Article 12(c) CTMR. 
66
 See the Misleading Advertisement Directive 84/450 of 10 September 1984, as amended by the Comparative 
Advertisement Directive 97/55 of 6 October 1997. These two Directives are now consolidated in the Misleading 
and Comparative Advertisement Directive 2006/114/EC of 12 December 2006. 
67
 See CJEU, 12 June 2008, case C-533/06, O2/Hutchison, para. 45; CJEU, 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, 
L’Oréal/Bellure, para. 54. 
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4. A Proper Balance? 
 
Considering the described measures to keep signs free and restrict the scope of trademark 
protection, several observations can be made with regard to the balance between trademark 
protection and freedom of expression in the EU. To keep signs free, the EU trademark system 
places too much reliance on the basic protection requirement of distinctiveness (4.1). As to 
safeguards for freedom of use, a need for additional exceptions comes to the fore after 
extensions of EU trademark rights that weakened inherent limits to the scope of protection, in 
particular the broad interpretation of what consitutes use as a trademark in relation to goods or 
services by junior users (4.2). 
 
4.1 Reliance on the Requirement of Distinctiveness 
 
As explained above, the basic protection requirement of distinctive character serves as a 
means of keeping signs free from trademark protection in several cases, including the case of 
descriptive and generic signs, and signs of cultural significance not having a high symbolic 
value. As there is a possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade, however, this 
bar to trademark protection remains surmountable and unpredictable. On its merits, EU 
trademark law leaves the decision on trademark protection in these cases to the marketing 
efforts of traders and the impact of these efforts on the perception of consumers. Enterprises 
may see the possibility of acquiring trademark rights as an incentive to invest in non-
distinctive, descriptive or generic signs.68 The EU trademark system may thus de facto 
provide an incentive for enterprises to invest in advertising campaigns educating consumers to 
perceive signs lacking distinctive character as an indication of commercial source. Once this 
marketing effort has the desired success, the sign can be registered. 
 
Considering the rationales underlying trademark law, this mechanism for obtaining trademark 
protection may be justified by pointing out that trademark law seeks to recognize the 
marketing efforts made by an individual trader and protect consumers against confusion by 
providing for the possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use in trade. The moment a 
non-distinctive, descriptive or generic sign is perceived as a reference to one particular 
commercial source, it seems to become necessary, from this perspective, to inhibit other 
traders from using that particular sign. 
 
The argument, however, rests on a circular line of reasoning: without the loophole of 
obtaining distinctiveness through use in trade as a basis for the acquisition of trademark 
rights, there would be less legal security for investment. Marketing campaigns aiming to teach 
consumers to recognize signs lacking distinctive character as identifiers of commercial source 
would be less attractive. This, in turn, would lead to a situation where the need to reduce a 
potential risk of consumer confusion by awarding trademark protection is less likely to arise 
in the first place. If enterprises refrained from attempting to teach consumers to recognize 
non-distinctive, descriptive or generic signs as source identifiers, consumers would not be 
confused with regard to the commercial origin of goods or services when these signs are used 
                                                 
68
 Cf. L.P. Ramsey, “Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment”, Tennessee Law Review 70 (2003), p. 
1095 (1155), who concludes with regard to the use of descriptive trademarks: “In contrast, when a descriptive 
term is first used as a mark, that mark is not yet distinctive, but it is valuable instantly – before any advertising or 
sales – because the term is attribute-identifying and provides information about the qualities and characteristics 
of the product. A business that selects and uses a descriptive term as a mark on its products is, in effect, free-
riding off the attribute-identifying value of the descriptive term.” 
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in the marketplace. As Professor Ramsey showed with regard to descriptive marks in the 
context of US trademark law,  
 
“…circular reasoning underlies the argument that confusing use of a descriptive term 
as a mark is misleading and can therefore be restricted to protect consumers. By 
granting and enforcing exclusive rights in descriptive marks, the government helps to 
make those marks source-identifying, which leads to the possibility of consumer 
confusion in the first place.”69 
 
Again, signs of cultural significance can serve as an example to illustrate this risk of 
dysfunctional incentives. As explained above, EU trademark law provides for the outright 
exclusion of official signs, signs of high symbolic value and religious signs.70 However, these 
exclusions do not necessarily reduce the exposure of cultural signs to trademark protection. A 
sign of cultural significance may constitute an important national symbol and fall under the 
exclusion of signs with a high symbolic value that has been adopted in several EU Member 
States. Cultural signs without high symbolic value, however, remain unaffected. The shape 
exclusions in EU trademark law71 may keep certain industrial designs and other three-
dimensional creations with cultural significance free from trademark protection.72 So far, 
however, these exclusions remained limited to three-dimensional signs.73 While this may be 
an efficient safeguard against the acquisition of trademark rights to technical solutions,74 
cultural material is much more diverse. Two-dimensional shapes, such as drawings, paintings 
and photographs, and musical shapes, such as melodies, do not qualify for the shape 
exclusions. In consequence, cultural signs, such as the name and portrait of a famous artist, 
distinctive parts of a painting, drawing or photograph, or a melody taken from a classical 
piece of music, can be registered as a trademark in many cases.  
                                                 
69
 Ramsey, ibid., p. 1150. See also R.C. Denicola, “Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the 
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols”, Wisconsin Law Review 158 (1982), p. 158 (170). For 
a critical assessment of trademark claims based on consumer expectations in general, see M.P. McKenna, “The 
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law”, Notre Dame Law Review 82 (2007), p. 1839 (1899). 
70
 Arts. 3(1)(h), 3(2)(b) and (c) TMD. 
71
 Art. 3(1)(e) TMD. 
72
 See General Court of the European Union, 6 October 2011, case T-508/08, Bang & Olufsen/OHIM. For a 
proposal to generally extend the substantial value exclusion to all shapes that are attractive because of their 
beauty, see V. Vanovermeire, “Inschrijving als merk van een in het openbaar domein gevallen werk”, in: A. 
Cruquenaire/S. Dusollier (eds.), Le cumul des droits intellectuels, Brussels: Larcier 2009, p. 177 (201-203). 
73
 As discussed above, the attempt made by the German Federal Patent Court, 9 November 2005, case 29 W (pat) 
147/03, “Porträtfoto Marlene Dietrich”, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2006, p. 333, to apply the 
exclusion to a portrait photograph was overruled by the German Federal Court of Justice, 24 April 2008, case I 
ZB 21/06, “Marlene-Dietrich-Bildnis”, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2008, p. 1093. Under the 
former Benelux provisions that served as a model for the current EU shape exclusions, the question of 
application to twodimensional shapes arose in the Burberry cases. In this context, an attempt to extend the 
exclusion’s scope to twodimensional shapes was made with regard to Burberrys’ tartan pattern by the Dutch 
courts. The Benelux Court of Justice, 14 April 1989, case A 87/8, “Burberrys I”, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 
1989, no. 834, para. 9, was prevented from a decision on this matter for procedural reasons in the first Burberry 
case. In a further decision on the tartan pattern, however, the Benelux Court of Justice, 16 December 1992, case 
A 90/4, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1992, no. 596, “Burberrys II”, para. 34-44, explicitly rejected the extension 
and confined the scope of the exclusion to threedimensional shapes. 
74
 Cf. CJEU, 18 June 2002, case C-299/99, Philips/Remington; CJEU, 14 September 2010, case C-48/09P, 
Lego/Mega Brands. See also the analysis of the functionality doctrine conducted by M.P. McKenna, 
“(Dys)functionality”, Houston Law Review 48 (2011), p. 824 (859-860), who concludes that different approaches 
to technical and esthetic functionality can only be harmonized on the basis of an overarching concept of fair 
competition that permits consistent answers to the question of whether, and to what extent, the copying of 
product features in general should be permissible or not. 
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Due to their predominant cultural meaning, signs of cultural significance may be qualified as 
rather weak trademarks. However, the CJEU refused to include the need to keep signs 
available for the public or other traders in the infringement analysis.75 A sign’s cultural 
significance, therefore, only leads to a relative weakness that may be overcome through 
marketing efforts.76 It does not constitute a stable factor to be considered generally in the 
context of infringement claims. The EU system permitting the acquisition of trademark rights 
once a sign of cultural significance has become distinctive may thus encourage enterprises to 
invest in advertising presenting a culturally important sign as an indication of commercial 
source. Positive cultural connotations attached to the sign may even spur investment by 
entrepreneurs seeking to benefit from pre-existing goodwill and recognition associated with 
signs of cultural significance. On its merits, the EU system thus provides incentives for 
advertising that may be qualified as a form of free-riding on a sign’s positive cultural 
connotations. This, in turn, will lead to unfair competitive advantages.  
 
When a cultural sign is finally entered in the trademark register, this registration may be used 
strategically by the trademark owner as an instrument to threaten third parties using the sign 
in an unrelated context with a potential infringement action. As explained above, mere 
references to the trademark can constitute relevant use as a trademark and offer a basis for an 
infringement claim in the EU. Thus, a trademark registration incorporating a cultural sign may 
have a deterrent – or “chilling” – effect on cultural activities, particularly in the case of 
trademark owners pursuing an aggressive enforcement strategy.77 The reliance placed on the 
requirement of distinctiveness as a tool for keeping signs of cultural significance free is thus 
doubtful. If an outright exclusion were applied to cultural signs – an exclusion that cannot be 
overcome through a showing of acquired distinctive character –, this would guarantee the 
unencumbered use of culturally important signs. Such a guarantee of free use without a risk of 
trademark infringement is likely to support political and artistic freedom of expression and 
follow-on innovation in the cultural sector.78 
 
3.2 Need for Additional Exceptions 
 
As explained above, the CJEU has continued to relax the general protection requirements of 
“use in the course of trade” and “use in relation to goods or services”. In particular, the 
requirement of use in relation to goods or services is applied flexibly. In principle, this general 
prerequisite for protection could be applied to confine the scope of trademark rights to 
instances where the senior user’s trademark is employed by a junior user as an identifier of 
commercial source with regard to its own goods or services. Following this approach, access 
to trademark protection could be contained from the outset. The entrance requirement of 
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trademark use would serve as a filter to exclude claims that are unrelated to the identification 
and distinction of goods and services. Considerable breathing space for freedom of use in 
political, cultural, educational and social contexts could be created in this way.79 
 
However, the CJEU takes the opposite approach, weakening the trademark use requirement 
instead of sharpening its conceptual contours. The reason for the increasingly elastic 
application of general protection requirements can be seen in the recognition of a broader 
range of protected trademark functions. The CJEU no longer focuses on the traditional origin 
function. In L’Oréal/Bellure, the Court held that, besides this essential function, a trademark’s 
quality, communication, investment, and advertising functions enjoyed absolute protection in 
double identity cases falling under Article 5(1)(a) TMD.80 These latter functions are typically 
fulfilled by marks with a reputation. A strong brand is capable of conveying lifestyle 
messages that are the result of substantial investment in advertising. Protection of a 
trademark’s communication, investment, and advertising functions is thus protection of the 
investment in the creation of a favourable brand image and the brand communication based 
on this image. However, the weaker the inherent limits of exclusive trademark rights, the 
stronger is the need for the adoption of exceptions that explicitly exempt certain forms of use 
from the control of the trademark owner. As posited by Professor Dinwoodie with regard to 
similar developments in US trademark law:  
 
“However, as the scope of trademark protection expands and the metes and bounds of 
protection become more uncertain, we cannot rely exclusively on creative 
interpretation of the prima facie cause of action to establish limits. Trademark law 
must more consciously develop defenses that reflect the competing values at stake in 
trademark disputes.”81  
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Against this backdrop, the need for new exceptions in EU trademark law is evident.82 With 
the relaxation of the requirement of use in relation to goods or services, the CJEU offers broad 
access to trademark protection beyond the traditional function of distinguishing one’s goods 
or services from those of others. Without appropriate exceptions providing defences in 
infringement cases, the reaction of EU trademark law to forms of referential and decorative 
use will most probably be too harsh.83 An enhanced infrastructure of exceptions is needed to 
re-establish a proper balance between rights and freedoms. 
 
There is cause for optimism in the EU, however, as the process of devising new exceptions 
has already started. In O2/Hutchison, the CJEU itself, as indicated above, took steps to create 
additional breathing space for references to trademarks in comparative advertising. The rules 
of the EC Comparative Advertisement Directive were openly applied as an external balancing 
tool that is not reflected in EU trademark law itself.84 The Court thus supplemented the 
exceptions within EU trademark law with an additional exception derived from external EU 
advertisement standards. In its further judgment in Interflora/Marks & Spencer, the CJEU 
confirmed its willingness to counterbalance broad exclusive rights by recognizing new 
exceptions. On the one hand, the Court confirmed its broad concept of protection against 
unfair free-riding in dilution cases.85 An online advertiser who derives benefits from a 
trademark with a reputation by selecting that trademark as a keyword for its own advertising, 
in principle, takes unfair advantage of the trademark with a reputation.86 On the other hand, 
however, the Court introduced a new type of “due cause” defence covering the purchase of 
trademarks as keywords in online advertising for the purpose of informing internet users of 
alternatives in the marketplace.87 As explained above, the defence of “due cause” also plays a 
central role in safeguarding the freedom of parody, criticism, and comment. This flexible 
preservation tool, however, is only available in the context of anti-dilution protection under 
Article 5(2) TMD.  
 
In double identity cases falling under Article 5(1)(a) TMD, a comparable balancing tool is 
sought in vain in EU trademark law. Considering that the CJEU seeks to protect goodwill 
functions in double identity cases besides the essential origin function, this lack of a 
comparable safeguard of user freedoms is highly problematic.88 The development of new 
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defences in EU trademark law must thus be seen as an incomplete process. Potentially, the 
CJEU will directly invoke the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression in Article 11 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights to create the required breathing space. In the present situation, the need to 
enshrine appropriate new defences for parody, criticism, and comment in EU trademark law is 
even more pressing than in the case of comparative advertising where the specific rules laid 
down in the Comparative Advertisement Directive are readily available.  
 
The proposal of the European Commission for amending EU trademark legislation contains 
important impulses in this regard. The Commission seeks to introduce an exception covering 
referential use in general.89 If this additional exception was adopted, it would create additional 
room for the CJEU to develop appropriate defences. As currently proposed by the 
Commission, the new exception would apply horizontally to all exclusive rights, including the 
problematic double identity rule in Article 5(1)(a) TMD where the flexible “due cause” 
defence is presently missing. Alternatively, the scope of Article 5(1)(a) TMD could be limited 
from the outset. The proposal of the European Commission also reflects this option. It would 
restrict the scope of Article 5(1)(a) TMD by including the additional requirement that use in 
double identity cases “affects or is liable to affect the function of the trade mark to guarantee 
to consumers the origin of the goods or services.”90 As a result, the extension of Article 
5(1)(a) TMD to goodwill functions – investment, advertising, communication – in 
L’Oréal/Bellure would be corrected. The provision would only apply in cases where the 
traditional origin function is affected. Referential use, including use for the purposes of 
comparative advertising and parody, would thus remain outside the scope of Article 5(1)(a) 
TMD as long as it does not suggest a connection with the trademark owner. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The analysis of mechanisms offering room for free speech within EU trademark law sheds 
light on several problem areas. In the area of exclusions from trademark protection, it is 
questionable whether the strong reliance placed on the basic protection requirement of 
distinctive character is appropriate. In respect of signs of cultural significance, for instance, 
EU trademark law largely leaves the acquisition of trademark rights to whether an aspiring 
trademark owner can establish distinctive character. Once trademark rights are acquired, the 
impact on use of the sign in a cultural context must not be underestimated. The marketing 
messages attached to the sign may supersede its original cultural meaning. The existence of 
trademark rights may have a deterrent effect on use for cultural follow-on innovation. Against 
this background, the EU approach to signs of cultural significance is wanting. EU policy 
makers should safeguard freedom of speech more efficiently by adopting an exclusion of 
signs of cultural significance that cannot be overcome through the acquisition of distinctive 
character in consequence of use in trade. This stricter approach would also inhibit traders 
from deriving unfair competitive advantages from positive cultural connotations that the sign 
had prior to the acquisition of trademark rights. 
 
In the area of restrictions of the scope of trademark protection, the analysis revealed that with 
the continuous expansion of trademark protection in the EU, inherent limits of exclusive 
rights become less and less reliable safe harbours for free speech. It has become more difficult 
to demarcate exactly the limits of actionable trademark use. Besides forms of use that would 
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interfere with the essential trademark function of signalling the commercial origin of goods 
and services, EU trademark owners may also have success in invoking trademark rights 
against forms of use, such as criticism, comment and parody, that do not impair the basic 
origin function, but may adversely affect brand image and goodwill. This expansion of 
trademark rights is likely to have an increasingly deterrent effect. The mere risk of being sued 
for trademark infringement because of a biting comment or parody may prevent users from 
engaging in these forms of free speech. To safeguard freedom of expression, it is thus 
advisable to reassure users of trademarked signs that certain forms of use are exempted from 
the control of the trademark owner by adopting appropriate exceptions that can be invoked as 
defences against alleged infringement. In this way, legal certainty can be re-established, and 
socially and culturally valuable use can be encouraged. 
  
